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Flashbots: Who controls each step?

Is Flashbots centralized or decentralized? Both: open software sits beside operator-run relays and RPCs, while validators choose where to send block requests.

The Hashbeam Desk··5 min read

Flashbots: Who controls each step?

Flashbots gives Ethereum users and validators tools to route transactions and source blocks, so how decentralized it is depends on which part they use.

The short answer is mixed. MEV-Boost and builder software are open source, but a service such as Flashbots Protect or a relay is run by an operator that users or validators must trust. Validators choose which relays to connect to, and alternatives exist at each layer.

Is Flashbots centralized or decentralized?

Start with the software. MEV-Boost and Flashbots builder code are open source, so anyone can inspect, audit, or run them. That makes the tools available without permission; it does not determine who operates the services or how much block-building activity each operator handles.

For a user, the first trust decision can happen before a transaction reaches Ethereum. Flashbots Protect is an RPC service that accepts transactions privately and forwards them for inclusion. A user trusts its operator to keep the transaction private and forward it honestly. Privacy from the public transaction pool shifts visibility to the service handling the private orderflow.

For a validator, MEV-Boost connects the validator’s client to block builders through relays. The validator can configure several relays, compare their bids, and choose a block. A relay’s bid is an offer; it is not the same as the validator already holding the complete block.

That distinction makes a relay a form of trusted escrow. The relay sends the proposer a blinded block header containing the bid, while withholding the full block. The proposer signs the header and returns the signature; the relay is then expected to reveal the matching block for publication. The proposer trusts the relay to release the payload and honor the bid. If it fails to reveal, the validator may lose the slot or miss the chance to publish that block. Using several relays means one relay’s failure need not prevent the validator from receiving bids from others, though it does not remove trust in the relay selected for a particular block.

Relay choice also affects censorship. The Flashbots Relay filters transactions involving OFAC-sanctioned addresses. A validator can avoid that relay and choose other relays, accepting the trust assumptions of those operators instead. The choice moves filtering power among services; it does not make transaction ordering neutral by itself.

Say a validator wants a competitive bid but also wants to avoid a relay with a filtering policy it rejects. It can configure MEV-Boost with multiple relays, receive bids, and select among them. The practical result depends on having alternative relays available and configured before proposing; the validator can see which bids arrive and which relay supplied each one. The software makes that choice possible, while the operators and market concentration shape the choices actually available.

A separate pressure comes from builders. A few builders produce most blocks, concentrating influence over transaction ordering even when their software is open source. BuilderNet, launched in 2024, aims to distribute block building across multiple operators using trusted execution environments, or hardware enclaves. SUAVE also aims to spread the builder role. Both address concentration at the building layer, but their designs introduce their own operational and hardware trust assumptions.

Flashbots describes its work on Flashbots; that context helps a user identify which parts of the transaction and block pipeline rely on an operator. The next step is to decide which service or relay you will trust, then check that your chosen provider and validator configuration match that decision.

Related questions

Does Flashbots censor transactions?

The Flashbots Relay filters OFAC-sanctioned addresses. That is a policy at the relay layer, not a rule applied by every Ethereum validator. Validators can choose other relays, while users should remember that private transaction routing also relies on the RPC operator forwarding transactions.

Who runs MEV-Boost relays?

Separate operators run individual relays; MEV-Boost is software validators use to connect to them. A validator chooses which relays to configure, so responsibility and trust depend on that selection rather than on one relay being mandatory.

What is BuilderNet?

BuilderNet is a block-building network that uses trusted execution environments and multiple operators. It aims to spread the building work and reduce dependence on a single builder, while still relying on its operators and enclave hardware.

What do proposer-builder separation and uncensoring relays change?

Which MEV-Boost relays do not censor?

Relay policies can differ and change, so verify the current policy of each operator before configuring it. The key point is that validators can select relays, including alternatives to one that filters certain addresses; that choice also means deciding which operator to trust with the relay’s role.

What is proposer-builder separation?

Proposer-builder separation divides block construction from block proposal: builders assemble blocks, and validators choose and propose them. MEV-Boost coordinates this exchange outside Ethereum’s core protocol. Enshrined PBS, described by EIP-7732, moves the builder-proposer exchange into the protocol. That changes where the separation is enforced, but it does not by itself settle every question about builder concentration or transaction privacy.