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Bitcoin developer sketches quantum landmines with BTC collateral
Cory Fields sketched a Bitcoin thought experiment that locks matching collateral during vulnerable-coin spends, giving prepared owners time to claim it after a quantum attack.
The Hashbeam Desk··4 min read

Bitcoin Core developer Cory Fields has proposed “quantum landmines,” a thought experiment that would make a future spender of quantum-vulnerable bitcoin lock up matching collateral, giving a prepared owner time to reclaim the coins and claim the collateral. Fields outlined the idea on the bitcoin-dev mailing list on Nov. 4, saying it assumes quantum-safe outputs already exist and new validation rules have been activated after a hypothetical quantum break. Fields’ mailing-list post calls the concepts thought experiments and leaves their soft-fork mechanics for future work.
How would a landmine catch a quantum thief?
Before quantum attacks become possible, an owner would put a hidden proof of control into a small quantum-safe output. Fields’ example uses a Taproot-like tree: one leaf commits to a new quantum-safe public key and carries a signature made with the private key for the vulnerable legacy output. The leaf remains hidden unless the owner later uses it as proof.
Under Fields’ assumed post-quantum rules, a legacy-output spend must be fully collateralized. In his example, spending a 1 BTC legacy output requires another 1 BTC from a quantum-safe output; both fund a 2 BTC output with a time lock. For 30 days, the output can be spent early only by proving pre-quantum knowledge of the legacy private key, and the destination must match the key committed in the owner’s proof. After the time lock, it can be spent without that proof.
A quantum attacker who derives the legacy private key would still lack the pre-quantum proof. The attacker’s transaction would therefore enter the waiting period. If the owner sees it, they could spend the locked output using the hidden proof, route the funds to the committed key and take the attacker’s collateral. Fields says the attacker cannot tell beforehand which vulnerable outputs have been armed.
What happens to coins without an active owner?
A landmine requires an owner who still controls the relevant key, so it cannot protect coins whose keys are lost. Fields sketches two auction designs for that gap, with different rules for bids and collateral.
In the “Staked Auction,” a bidder would commit quantum-safe coins before the quantum threat, tied to a particular vulnerable output. After an attempted spend and an initial time out, bidders could reveal bids and claim portions of the attacker’s collateral. Fields leaves several parameters open: bids could be slashed or returned, and unused collateral could be burned or distributed. His example uses a vulnerable 50 BTC output and a 40 BTC staked bid; those figures illustrate the design rather than prescribe fixed amounts.
The “Sats Auction” would not require pre-quantum staking. Instead, a spend of legacy coins would trigger an auction after the landmine time out. The highest bidder would get the coins minus their bid; the second-highest bidder would lose their bid without receiving anything. That creates a risk of escalating bids, including for an attacker who starts the process.
What would Bitcoin need to change?
The design depends on new quantum-safe output types and post-quantum validation rules that make legacy spends collateralized and enforce time locks and alternate spend paths. Fields says such behavior might be enforced by soft-fork rules, but does not specify the rules. It is not an implemented Bitcoin feature or a formal upgrade proposal in the post.
The collateral condition also applies to legitimate holders spending their own vulnerable coins: under the example, an owner moving 1 BTC would need another 1 BTC as collateral. Fields does not resolve that cost or set a required collateral ratio. As CoinDesk’s report on the proposal notes, the ideas also leave lost coins outside the owner-claim mechanism. Fields says the best auction design is unclear, including whether the goal should be to deter attacks, redistribute coins or produce another outcome.
References
- Fields’ mailing-list post — mirror.b10c.me
- CoinDesk’s report on the proposal — coindesk.com