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Binance reports $3bn frozen after $6.3bn hot-wallet breach

Binance says partners have frozen about $3 billion after an incident drained roughly $6.3 billion from its hot wallets, while investigators trace the funds.

The Hashbeam Desk··3 min read

Binance reports $3bn frozen after $6.3bn hot-wallet breach

Binance said partners had frozen about $3 billion in assets after a security incident drained an estimated $6.3 billion from its hot wallets, a breach that exposed how much recovery can depend on token issuers and blockchain governance. In its October 30 incident update, the exchange said the withdrawals began around 20:05 UTC on October 29, and that its investigation had uncovered additional points of breach beyond an initially suspected compromised laptop. Binance said it had found no evidence of wallet private keys being leaked; it had not yet published a technical post-mortem.

How did the attacker gain control of an Ethereum wallet?

Elliptic’s on-chain analysis says the attacker used Ethereum’s EIP-7702 delegation feature against Binance’s hot wallet known as Binance 14. EIP-7702, introduced in Ethereum’s 2025 Pectra upgrade, lets a regular wallet authorize a smart contract to act on its behalf. According to Elliptic’s analysis of the Binance theft, the attacker submitted one transaction containing 50 authorizations signed with Binance 14’s key, each using a different nonce so one would match the wallet’s transaction count when processed. That delegated control to the attacker’s “sweeper” contract, which then moved assets out of the wallet.

Elliptic says the delegation remained active, allowing the attacker to move funds without obtaining new signatures for each transaction. It also reports that Binance 14’s owner rights were used to pull USDC from another Binance wallet. Binance has said the attack sequence remains under investigation and that it found no evidence of a private-key leak. The exchange has not confirmed Elliptic’s reconstruction or explained how the authorizations passed its controls.

What does freezing $3 billion actually stop?

The freeze blocks movement of specific assets where an issuer or network authority can intervene; it does not reverse the original withdrawals across every chain. Elliptic attributes most of the confirmed freezes to USDT and USDC, whose issuers can blacklist addresses. It says Tether froze funds in the attacker’s Ethereum wallet, followed by Circle freezing USDC there. These controls apply to the issuers’ tokens, not to native assets such as ETH or BTC, which have no central issuer able to freeze a wallet.

Some networks can act through governance. Elliptic reports that Arbitrum’s Security Council moved assets out of the attacker’s reach, and that Optimism’s governance appeared to do the same with OP tokens. Those interventions are distinct from issuer blacklisting: they depend on each network’s authority and rules. Elliptic had verified $2.85 billion frozen or seized on-chain by about 05:50 UTC on November 1, close to Binance’s estimate of $3 billion. Its figure includes assets secured through several different mechanisms, not a single exchange-wide reversal.

What remains exposed, and what is Binance doing?

Elliptic says nothing stolen on Bitcoin, XRP Ledger, Solana or NEAR had been frozen at that time, in part because native assets on those chains lack an issuer with blacklist powers. The attacker had also converted some stablecoins into ETH and TRX before freezes took effect. A freeze therefore narrows what can be moved but does not guarantee recovery of the full amount.

Binance said it had suspended withdrawals while it checked and remediated affected systems, while deposits and other unaffected services remained operational. It said it would cover the losses through its Secure Asset Fund for Users and corporate funds, and had set aside more than $6.34 billion, including $5 billion in the affected tokens. The exchange said a full technical report would follow once investigators verified the attack sequence. Until then, the precise route into its signing infrastructure and the remaining recoverable balance are unresolved.

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